The first officer acknowledged this instruction. About , the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About , the local controller cautioned the flight pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About , the flight captain said to the first officer, "you have the airplane.
About , the first officer asked the captain, "you happy with that [separation] distance? He's supposed to be five miles by the time we're airborne, that's the idea. The captain received a type rating on the A in September while serving as a first officer and received a type rating on the Boeing in December He completed initial operating experience as an A captain in August According to American Airlines records, the captain joined the U. Air Force Reserves in June He flew T, T, and C airplanes while on duty and received an honorable discharge in He had accumulated 1, hours total flying time in military and general aviation before his employment with American Airlines.
The captain had a good background in high performance aircraft. The first officer who flew with the captain on November 9 and 10, , described the captain's management style as "ideal. Another first officer who flew recently with the captain stated that he was "confident, respected, and able to get a point across in a nice way. He had accumulated 3, hours total flying time in commercial and general aviation before his employment with American Airlines.
The first officer's background with large aircraft was very limited. American Airlines records also indicated that the first officer had accumulated 4, hours total flying time,26 including 1, hours as an A second-in-command.
He had flown approximately and 52 hours in the 90 and 30 days before the accident. An American Airlines captain who flew several times with the first officer on the when they were a junior captain and junior first officer, respectively told Safety Board investigators that, during one flight sometime in , the first officer had been "very aggressive" on the rudder pedals after a wake turbulence encounter.
Specifically, the captain indicated that, when the airplane was at an altitude of between 1, and 1, feet, the first officer "stroked the rudder pedals , about that fast. The captain stated that he then asked the first officer what he was doing and that the first officer replied that he was "leveling the wings due to wake turbulence. The captain did not recall what type of airplane the was following. He thought that the wake turbulence encounter required only aileron inputs to level the wings but did not think that the first officer had made any such inputs during the encounter.
The captain recalled being startled by the first officer's rudder inputs and indicated that they did not level the wings but created left and right yawing moments and heavy side loads on the airplane. He further indicated that the first officer did not need to be so aggressive because the was "a very stable airplane.
The captain pointed out to the first officer that his use of the rudder pedals was "quite aggressive," but the first officer insisted that the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner. The captain disagreed with the first officer and told him that the AAMP directed that the rudder was to be used at lower airspeeds.
The captain told the first officer to review the AAMP when he returned home and to be less aggressive on the rudder pedals when they flew together. But Benzon couldn't shake the thought. He had just been in New York just one month before, digging through the rubble of what was the World Trade Center looking for flight recorders that would never be found from planes that had been used as missiles.
And now, the investigation of another airplane catastrophe awaited him. For Benzon and his team, the numbers didn't add up. American Airlines Flight 's three-and-a-half-hour trip to Santo Domingo ended only two-and-a-half minutes and four miles southwest from its takeoff.
The National Weather Service had reported blue skies with 10 miles of visibility. Hundreds of eyewitnesses gave accounts of the burning engines separating from the plane and other explosions that showered chunks of metal onto a five-block radius of Belle Harbor.
Benzon had been a lead investigator in several high profile air crashes, including the TWA Flight crash that had killed people off the coast of Long Island. But the Flight disaster was especially difficult to investigate. Something remained the same for Benzon: the stench.
By listening to the flight data recorder, Benzon's team was able to step "virtually into the cockpit " from beginning to end of the flight. But it was hard to find clues in the short conversation. At about a. On the tape, this was followed an interaction between pilot Edward States and First Officer Sten Molin -- a brief, somewhat playful conversation about their plane's distance from a Japan Airlines Boeing He's supposed to be five miles by the time we're airborne, that's the idea," States replied.
Communication between the two men in the cockpit and the controller was normal over the next minute-and-a-half, as Flight started its takeoff. At that point, States asked Molin, " On the voice recorder, a thump, a click, and two thumps could be heard. Suddenly, Molin requested "max power" in a strained voice and States asked him, "Are you all right?
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